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No. 84-433
Cert. to CAl (Campbell,
Swygert [by designation] &
Bownes)
Federal/Civil

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

The CAl, apparently contrary to several other
'"""\

/(

circuits, has held that parents who unilaterally place their
handicapped child in a private school may later recover

tui~ion

costs under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.
2.
(

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

Resp Robert Panico is the

parent of a child with learning disabilities, Michael.

Michael

was attending public school under an individualized educational
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plan (IEP) drawn pursuant to the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA). Michael continued to experience learning
difficulties, however, and in 1979, near the close of his thirdgrade year, school officials prepared
/' (_

..,....

at a different public school.

- - - -·
this plan ano sought

a ~~~J) placing

Michael

The Panicos were dissatisfied with

review by the state Department of Education.
I

Prior to the commencement· of hearings in September, the Panicos
transferred Michael to a private school for learning-disabled
children.
In January, 1980, the state hearing officer held that petr's
~

~ was

inadequate and inappropriate, and ordered

1/

pe~~pay

,,

both past and future tuition at Michael's private school.

----------------------------·~·----~---------~

Petr

then filed suit in the D. Mass., seeking to reverse the state

(

1

~dministrative or~~' on the basis of both the EAHCA and a~ogous

~
state law. The DC denied a stay of the order requiring payment
and entered summary judgment in favor of the Panicos and the
state on the state-law count.

Meanwhile, Michael remained in private school and no further
IEPs were drawn.

In February, 1981, petr agreed, under threat of

a funding cut-off, to pay for Michael's education at the private
school for the 1980-81 schdbl year and prospectively, but refused
to reimburse the Panicos for tuition costs for the 1979-80 school
~--,

year.

~tr

appealed the DC rulings to the CAl.

v. Dept of Education, 655 F.2d 428 (CAl 1981).

(

Town of Burlington
The ~1 dismissed

the state count on the merits, holding that the state-law
standard of review conflicted with the federal standard and was

-3I

preempted.

The CAl upheld the order requiring petr to pay

prospective tuition costs, but held that petr did not have to pay

(P~~5{ until ~~erits

were finally adjudicated.

The

federal claim was remanded for trial.
~
-·
- ----...
On remand, the DC reversed the state administrative order
··-

·

'----------------------------------------~

and held that petr's IEP was adequate and appropriate.

--------- - the prevailing party, was

Petr, as

held entitled to reimbursement for

tuition, transportation costs, and other expenses related to
~

---------~

Michael's education at the private school for prior years.
The Panicos and the state appealed.

TJ e CAl

h~

that the

DC had failed to give sufficient deference to the state
administrative proceedings and remanded for further

(

consideration.

The CAl held that, although a federal

--

not award relief on the basis of violations of state law, the
federal law in question

s ~s.

------------

the EAHCA -- incorporated state

In this case the DC merely ruled the numerous

findings of the state hearing officer regarding violations of
state law "irrelevant."
as bearing on

The findings should have been reviewed

he federal right to an appropriate education.

The CAl also discussed the question of reimbursement, which
was bound to arise on remand.

Petr argued that the Panicos

were barred from any reimbursement relief because they had
enrolled Michael in private school prior to the conclusion of the
state administrative proceedings.
(

violated 20

u.s.c.

This action, petr contended,

§1415(e) (3), which provides:

7
~7

-4During the pendency of any proceedings conducted
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational agency and the parents or guardian
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then
current educational placement of such child, . • •
until all such proceedings have been completed.

The ~Al

recognized that three circuits have held that
...

"'

=--

'"'

parents are not entitled to reimbursement if they ~ nilaterally

--------------'---------------------------~
move
a child to private school while proceedings are

See Mt. View-Los Altos United High School District v. Sharron
B.H., 709 F.2d 28 (CA9 1983) : ~ emple v. Board of Education, 623
F.2d

8934 ~

cert. denied, 450

v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 598 (1980).

u.s.

911 (1981); Monahan

The CAl had already

departed from Stemple -- the leading case -- and joined the CA7
in holding that §1415(e) (3) established "a strong preference, but
(

not a statutory duty, for maintenance of the status quo."

See

Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910, 918, citing Anderson v. Thompson,
658 F.2d 1205, 1209 (CA7 1981).

v

The CA4 in Stemple had

overlooked legislative history indicating that Congress saw the
need for flexibility in applying the EAHCA.

The CA4's rule

exalted "form over substance because parents are barred from
reimbursement if they change the child's placement at all prior
to the termination of all proceedings, regardless of whether they
rely on expert advice or a state agency decision in their favor,
and even though the school system is held not to have proposed an
appropriate education for the child."

A better rule was to allow

reimbursement if the parents' actions are held to be appropriate
at final judgment.

(

If, however, the school system proposed and

had the capacity to implement an appropriate IEP, reimbursement
would be denied.

If the parents did not attempt in good faith to

-5-

..
J

gain an agreement with the school system before moving the child,
their failure to negotiate might be taken into account as a
factor weighing against reimbursement.
The CAl further held that, when parents have relied on a
state administrative decision in their favor in placing their
child in a private school, a local education agency may not
obtain reimbursement from them even if it ultimately prevails in
court.

In this case, however, the Panicos could not have relied

on the state administrative decision until it issued, in January
1980.

Accordingly, they could not claim immunity from

reimbursement for amounts petr had expended before that date.
Nor could they do so for any time period subsequent to the period
covered by the state administrative order.
Finally, the CAl held that if petr's procedural violations
amounted to "bad faith," petr might be barred from collecting any
reimbursement from the parents.
Petr requested rehearing and rehearing en bane.

This was

denied.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs:

(1)

The CAl erred in declining to

follow the CA4, CAS and CA9 on the question of reimbursement.
First, the Stemple rule followed by these other circuits is not
as inflexible as the CAl believed.

Parents may change the

placement while proceedings are pending provided that the local
or state authorities agree to the change.

Second, local

educational authorities are subject to serious financial
(

sanctions for violating the EAHCA and will not routinely
disregard their duties.

Third, a DC may issue a preliminary

.

~

'

'-6-

...

.'

injunction before the completion of state administrative
proceedings, if federal rights will be irreparably damaged.
Fourth, Congress chose to prohibit self-help explicitly in
§l415(e) (3), and it could have had any number of good reasons for
~

doing so.

(2) Th ~l relied on the view that Massachusetts provides
enforceable procedural and substantive rights for a learningdisabled child independent of federal law.

The CAl ruled that

under Massachusetts law, local school authorities that have
complied with the EAHCA may nevertheless be compelled to pay for
a child's private education if they have departed from statemandated policies.

If Massachusetts had adopted such a rule, it

would conflict with federal law, which favors "mainstreaming" of
handicapped children whenever possible.
(3)

The CAl erroneously restricted testimony by persons who

testified or could have testified at the administrative hearing.
(4)

The law of the case requires that petrs, as prevailing

parties, are entitled to reimbursement for amounts expended on
Michael's tuition and related expenses.
( 5)

/

.

Even apart from the law of the case, t h e Pan1cos are

not entitled to damages.

Every other CA that has considered the

issue, with the possible exception of the CA7, has held that
there is no right to damages under the EAHCA.

See Marvin H. v.

Austin Independent School District, 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (CAS
1983): Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081 (CAll 1983): Miener
(

v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (CAS), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
215 (1982).

A bright-line rule prohibiting self-help is far

-7preferable to the equitable considerations outlined by the CAl,
which will only lead to "Byzantine distinctions."

Damages are

inappropriate under the EAHCA even when parents have relied on a
favorable state administrative ruling, as here; §1415(e) (3)
requires that no change in placement occur until state or local
school authorities agree to this.
(6)

Because the Panicos refused to cooperate in any effort

to compose an IEP for the years subsequent to 1979-80, they are
not entitled to any reimbursement for those years.

The CAl held

that petr should have continued to prepare IEPs for Michael while
review proceedings were pending, but failed to explain how it
could have done this when the Panicos refused to make Michael or

(

his school records available for evaluation.
Resps:

(1)

--

- ~

The questions presented ar ~not r ~

ruling on reimbursement is entirely

The CA's

dependen ~~ r

the

Panicos prevail on remand. Even if they prevail, the CA simply
discussed factors to be considered by the DC in the exercise of
its discretion.

The CA's ruling on the admissibility of evidence

is similarly unripe:

even if erroneous, it may be harmless to

petr if petr ultimately prevails.
(2)

I

Each of the questions presented involves the exercise
~~~---------~----~~~~~~

of discretionary judgment by the lower courts, and this Court
does not ordinarily grant cert to review such questions.

The CA

characterized the appropriateness of reimbursement as an
equitable question.
("

On the evidentiary question, this is an area

in which TCs traditionally have broad discretion.

"'.

Petrs' "law of

-8-

I

I

the case" argument fails for similar reasons.

In any event, what

petrs characterize as "law of the case" was merely dictum.
(3)

The CAl's holding that reimbursement may be available

to the prevailing party under the EAHCA does not conflict with
decisions of other CAs.

The CAl held that retroactive

reimbursement may be awarded to the prevailing party as damages
under §1415(e) (2), and then set forth circumstances under which
such an award would not be appropriate.

This equitable approach

is generally in accord with that of other CAs.

The cases petr

cites as being in conflict have not considered the availability
of reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings.

The

CA2 and CA3 have considered the issue of interim funding during
the pendency of an appeal.

(

See Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d

49, 52 (CA2 1982); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 323 (CA3
1982).

The CA4 and CAS dealt only with reimbursement to parents

who unilaterally transferred their child to a private school
during the pendency of proceedings.

See Stemple, supra; Stacy G.

v. Pasadena Ind. Sch. Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 953-54 (CAS 1983).
The CAB and CAll have addressed only the availability of
compensatory and punitive damages where a child has remained in
an inappropriate placement.

Powell, supra; Miener, supra.

The

law in this area is still evolving, and certiorari should be
eschewed in favor a series of CA decisions.
(4)

The CA was correct in remanding to the DC for

consideration of petr's procedural violations, even if they were
(

in part violations of state law.

This Court has recognized the

importance of the EAHCA's procedural safeguards.

o;" .,.

Board of

.
o;

·-

-9-

Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 {1982).

The CA's

guidelines on the admissibility of evidence additional to that
presented at the administrative hearing are consistent with
Rowley's requirement that administrative proceedings be given due
weight.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Petrs' claims

---

concernin~eimbursement

------

and ?

damages are the only ones that appear to be cert-worthy, and they
-

-----

also appear to be closely related.

The CAl discussed the issue

solely in terms of "reimbursement," not "damages," and even petr
-- although addressing the two points separately -- appears to
equate them.

See petn at 24.

The "reimbursement" cases appear

to be a subset of the "damages" cases that have been decided
under §1415{e) {2), a provision that allows aggrieved parties to

(

bring a civil action, and a district court to "grant such relief
as [it] determines is appropriate."

According to resp,

"reimbursement" is limited to tuition and related expenses, while
"damages" encompasses compensatory and punitive damages, which
are not at issue here.

See, e.g., Marvin H., supra {parents

sought recovery of expenses for private psychiatric counseling
and hospitalization).

Cf. Anderson v. Thompson, supra {parents

were complying in part with §1415{e) {3) by keeping child halftime in current placement and half-time in private school, so
question was availability of "damages" rather than
"reimbursement").
In any event, the holdings in both kinds of cases appear

-----

contrary to at least the spirit of the CAl hot ding, and in some

-------------

instances to the letter of the holding as well.

...

Resps are

-10J

correct that many of them can be distinguished, but the CAl
itself perceived that it was rejecting the rule of the CA4, CA8
and possibly the CA9.

Moreover, resps' attempt to distinguish

the CA4 and CAS cases is not successful:

those courts have

during the pendency of proceedings, without the
~~

----------~--~~~-

f the

local school authorities, they are barred from
reimbursement.
at 898.

See Stacey G., 695 F.2d at 954; Stemple, 623 F.2d

The CAl rule would allow (although apparently would not

require) reimbursement if the parents ultimately prevail on the
merits, or if they were acting in reliance on an administrative
determination that is ultimately overturned.
The CAl is, however, the first court to perceive.. . . .- a

(

on this question.

~it"

Most courts at least purport to follow the CA7

opinion in Anderson, which held that damages under the EAHCFA are
not within the scope of "appropriate" relief absent "exceptional
circumstances."

Parents might be justified in resorting to self~

help only if the child's physical health were endangered, or if
the school district acted in bad faith by failing to comply with
the procedural provisions of §1415 in an egregious fashion.
Judge Swygert, the author of Anderson, was a member of the CAl
panel below, and the opinion cites Anderson with approval.

But

the CA9 also relied on Anderson in refusing to allow
reimbursement to a parent who had unilaterally placed a child in
private school before a final determination had been made.
(

Mountain View-Los Altos, supra.

The CAl in its opinion below

/

..

-11I

cited Mountain View-Los Altos as contrary authority.

See Petn at

127A n.31.
Resp's arguments concerning unripeness and the desirability
of allowing this issue to percolate among the lower courts are
unconvincing.

While it is true that the CA merely outlined

factors for the DC to consider, the appropriateness of those
factors is a question of law that is severable from their
application to the facts of this case.

The case has now been

remanded twice, and if the CAl's factors are ultimately
determined to be erroneous on another appeal it will be remanded
yet a third time.

It is also true, as resps argue, that a clear

circuit split has not yet "crystallized," but I'm not sure that a
"let a hundred flowers bloom" approach is desirable.

(

The issue

is obviously a complex one, and I think the lower courts would
welcome some guidance from this Court.

On the other hand, the

lower courts may eventually arrive at a synthesis of Stemple,
Anderson and the rule set forth in this case.
recently urged to overrule Stemple.

Hessler v.

Education, 700 F.2d 134, 139 (CA4 1983).

The CA4 was
State Board of

The court found it

unnecessary to reach the question whether Stemple was an
"absolute bar to recovery whenever there is a unilateral
placement choice by parents," but noted that an "exception" to
Stemple was recognized in Anderson, and that one DC had declined
to follow Stemple.

It is possible that the CA4 will choose to

reconsider or modify Stemple in an appropriate case, possibly
(

arriving at the same result as the CAl.

~·

<
I

~12-

(~ -~4) _and

As for petr ' s other claim(

( 6) are __

fa~d .

r he CA did n;t-h~ld-that state

Claim (2) appears exaggerated:

•

law standards should govern instr ad of federal law standards, but
rather that violations of state regulations "are material and
relevant to the determination of \ whether the federal right to a
I

I

free appropriate public

educatio~

has been provided under the
I

\

IEP."

It specifically addressed

~etr's

argument that state

standards might conflict with the federal "mainstreaming" policy,
and held that a state standard that conflicted with that policy
could not be enforced.
5.

Petn at llla n.l9.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend a grant limited to

questions (1) and (5).
There is a response.

(

November 6, 1984
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Opin in petn.

(
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

/

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmarie

Re:

No. 84-433
School

March 14, 1985

Committee

of

Burlington et al

v.

Mass.

Dep't of

Educ. et al

To be argued Tuesday, March 26, 1985
Questions Presented
(1)

Does §1415(e) (2)

of the Education of the Handicapped

,C.

II

\'

-

Act [the ERA] authorize the award of damages to reimburse parents
~

-

-

for tuition if it is determined that the appropriate educational

-~f or t h e1r
.,c 4~
h'ld
·1s
. ~
p 1 acement
1
1n a pr1va t e sc h oo 1?.
A

( 2)
parents

Is the award of such damages bar red by §1415 (e) ( 3)

u~

-::::..

change

their

chi'ld 's

"current"

if

placement

without the consent of school officials?

•'
'

';{

Discussion
A. Availability of Damages under §1415 (e) (2)
Petrs argue that §1415(e) (2) of the ERA does not authorize
the award of damages in cases such as this.
that

Congress

under

could

not have

this section because

the federal DCs.

intended

First, they contend

to permit damage

it gives concurrent

awards

jurisdiction to

Since damage suits against the State would be

barred by the 11th Amendment, petrs contend that Congress could
not have intended to authorize this unconstitutional exercise of
jurisdiction.

This argument is not persuasive.
-

· ·"'---

~--

-·

In many, if not

'V

most, ERA cases, the school district or ~nicipal government, not
the State, will be the defendant and thus there will be no 11th
Amendment problem at all.

Suits against the State for

----~

damages

may be brought in State court.
Second,

petrs

claim

that

a

private

damages

remedy

is

superfluous because other provisions of the ERA are sufficient to
ensure

enforcement

of

the

Act.

They

note

that

financial

sanctions may be imposed if school districts fail to provide the
appropriate
however,

education guaranteed by

are

not

found

in

the

the Act.

section of

the

These

sanctions,

Act

authorizing

civil actions by private parties and they do not provide relief
to private parties for wrongs done to them.
damages

are

§1415(e) (2)

"appropriate

relief"

within

The question whether
the

meaning

of

thus is not answered by the fact that other parts of

the Act provide other enforcement mechanisms.
Finally,

petrs

argue

that

school

districts

may

find

it

cheaper and more convenient to take the risk df paying damages in

.

i'.

"·
individual
required

cases

by

the

than
ERA.

to

provide

the

appropriate

Thus,

they

assert,

the

education

availability

damages would undermine the central purpose of the Act.
nothing

but speculation on petrs'

part.

themselves

note,

including
used

there

are

injunctions and

if

a

school

faith

district

provides

a

means

financial

manner suggested by petrs.
bad

other

chose

of

enforcing

sanctions.

to operate

---

This is

Additionally,

....._...~---~

of

as they
the

Act,

These could be
in

the

bad

faith

I don't think the possibility of such

reason

for

interpreting

§1415(e) (2)

to

preclude damages.
Petrs

have

not

focused
~--t

..

on

the

strongest

argument

for

reversing CAl, made by CA7 in Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205
~

(CA7 1981).

CA7 reasoned that in context, it seems unlikely that

,,

"appropriate relief" under §1415(e) (2) includes damages.
1415

is

entitled

~

procedural

"Procedural

safeguards

public education

Section

\\

required

to ensure

is provided,

It

Safeguards."
that

details

free

the

appropriate

including parental access to all

relevant records, written notice to parents whenever a change in
a

child's

is

agency,

the opportunity

respect

to

impartial
e(2),

-

placement

the
due

proposed
for

their child,

hearing

on

an

educational

and

the

right

to an

Subsection

allows parties aggrieved by

this section to bring a civil

In this context, CA7 thought that "appropriate relief" was

district

' ,. ._..

by

such

the provision at issue here,

the outcome of proceedings under
suit.

refused

parents to present complaints with

placement of
process

or

judge

wide

latitude

to

fashion

an

individualized

4.

educational

program

for

the

658

child. ·"

at

F.2d,

1211.

Subsection (e) (2), in CA7's view, represents the last step in the
procedural chain by which Congress hoped to ensure an appropriate
education

for

--

every child.

Most lower courts

that have dealt

with this question have followed CA7's logic.
Although CA7's

view

is

plausible,

I

am

not

persuaded

that the statutory context precludes damages from the rubric of
"appropriate
safeguards

relief."
is

to

The

arrive

handicapped child.

whole

at

an

point

of

the

appropriate

program

expense,

is

later

determined

to

be

the

~

placement

thaf:

for

the

-

If a private school placement, undertaken at

-~

parental

procedural

the

school

system

should

have

appropriate

provided

in

the

first place, then the statute's goal is seemingly best served by
allowing

the DC to reimburse the parents for

tuition.

If such

reimbursement is not available, then the children of parents who
simply could

not afford

expectation

of

to pay private school

reimbursement
placements

would

pending

be

tuition with no
to

endure

Thus,

CA7's

forced

review.

interpretation seems to undermine the goal of the statute as a
whole.

they

Resps cite two references in the legislative history that
~~--~-----------believe demonstrate Congress'
intent to make damages

available.

The

§1415 (e) (2),

stated

appropriate relief"
cite

this

Senate

Conference

Report,

referring

to

"grant

all

to

(emphasis added).

discussion

of

tuition

--------

More significantly, resps

reimbursement

in

the

Senate

Report, referring to a predecessor of §1415 (e) ( 2) :

.·

5.

If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at
that parent 1 s own expense, to seek private schooling
for the child because an appropriate program does not
exist within the local education agency responsible for
the child 1 s education and the local education agency
disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who
remains financially responsible is a matter to which
the due process procedures established under section
614(5) apply.

Additionally, federal regulations explicitly provide that the due
process procedures of the Act apply in such disputes.

34 C.F.R.

§300.403.
According
Congress

intended

judicial

resps,
to

to

for

prohibit

accordance

with

a

"it

defies

require!

proceedings

responsibility
time,

to

that

be

used

private

school

the

district

the

to

of

to

contend

determine

from

that

administrative

placement,

court

determination

This overstates the case.

logic

but

financial
at

awarding

financial

and

the

same

relief

in

responsibility."

Congress could have intended that the

due process procedures apply to such disputes, but that the DC 1 s
resolution have prospective effect only.
of

the

language of

the Senate Report

remains f in ailc"ially responsible"
thought

pa...rents

I

ultimat~ly

could

be

Still, a fair reading
___.,
-- "the question of who

-- suggests that the Committee

reimbursed

for

private

tuition

if

it

was determined that placement in a private school was

appropr1ate.
The question is a close
up

to

its

education,
expense,

,., ..

·.

statutory
and

it

parents

certainly

e.

obligation
are
seems

forced

If a district does not live
to

provide

an

appropriate

to provide one at their own

"appropriate"

for

the DC

to order

lndee~,

that the parents be reimbursed.

such reimbursement may

well be necessary to make meaningful parents' right to contest a
school

district's

proposed

educational

plan

for

their

child.

Thus, I am inclined to recommend affirming CAl on this question.
B. Impact of §1415 (e) (3)
Subsection e(3) provides:
During
the pendency of any proceedings conducted
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local
educational
agency
and
t l1'eParents
or
guardian
oth.e,.t:~ise agree, the Ch ild shall remain in the then
curre t
ducational la~ o r such ch i ld .

Petrs

that

argue

appropriate relief

even

assuming

that

in some circumstances under,

damages

§1415(e) (3)

are
the

parents' unilateral decision to change their child's placement in
violation

of

e (3)

bars

-----------------

damages

the

reimbursement as
....
>
The statute does not state that this or

in this case.

any other penalty

award

is required,

of

tuition

although

it seems reasonable

to

assume that there must be some consequence for failure to abide
by the statute's mandate. CAl is probably right that this section
was meant to prevent school districts from unilaterally changing
a child's placement before due process proceedings are completed;
the language, however,

is much broader and thus probably should

govern parental behavior as well.

~"'
1- J
~~

the facts of this case, however,
On

to

reach

reimbursement

when

necessary

~

placement.

It

is

the

question

parents
clear

whether

unilaterally

that both

the

I don't think it is
(e) (3)
change

bars
a

tuition
child's

school district and the

parents agreed here that the child's placement at Memorial School

.·

ap~roprj ate.

was.. no longer

th~

Neither

language of the section,

nor logic, supports petrs' claim that their proposed alternative
became

the

"otherwise

"then
agreed"

current
that

Since

placement."

the

student

should

not

both

parties

remain

in

his

current placement, and the statute is silent on what happens in
these circumstances,

I

think the matter should be treated as if

the child had no current placement and the parties were deciding
for

the

parents'

first

time

what

to

place

choice

__

I

to

do.

him

in

In
a

these

private

circumstances,
school

J1

pending

the
the

\

outcome ....of review proceedings was a reasonable
one, as evidenced
-----.
by

the

~

ALJ's

determination

that

this

appropriate placement for the child.
that damages

are

bars recovery of

available

under

tuition payments

private

school

was

the

Thus, if the Court decides

(e)(2),

I

don't

think

(e)(3)

I /'

in the circumstances of t his

./

c 'a se.
Conclusion
In sum,

I would affirm CAl on the availability of tuition

reimbursement under §1415(e) (2).
whether

§1415(e) (3)

bars

such

I would not reach the question
reimbursement

where

parents

unilaterally change a child's placement, on the ground that both
parties agreed that the current placement was inappropriate.

:r.

March 19, 1985
BURLING GINA-POW
84-433

School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts
Department of Educatioin (CAl)
(To be argued Tuesday, March 26)

MEMO TO FILE
On the basis of a preliminary review of the principle
briefs

and

Annmarie's

bench

memo,

I

think

the

case

is

close but I am inclined tentatively to think that Annmarie
that CAl should be affirmed on the principal

is right:
question

with

§1415(e) (2)
Act.

I

respect

to

tuition

reimbursement

.._

under

--=- ~>

of the Education for all Handicapped Children

also would

like

to avoid

addressing

the

second

question presented by the parties, and think we need not
reach it.
The Principle Question
Does

It

'"'~

damages

§1415 (e) (2)
to

determined

of

reimburse
that

the

the Act authorize the award of

parents

for

appropriate

tuition
placement

if
for

it

is

their

handicapped child is in a private school?
Although
damages

award,

legislative

the

Act

is

not

specific

the

general

purpose

history

suggest

that

of

in authorizing
the

parents

Act

should

and

a

its

have

a

? .

right to recover - by a suit in federal district court reimbursement of
handicapped

tuition expenses required to send their

child

to

a

private

school

when

the

town's

public school did not provide appropriate training.
There is nothing to petitioner's Eleventh Amendment
argument,

as

these cases are brought against the school

district

or

a

municipal

itself.

Moreover,

suits

government,
against

and

the

not

the

state

state

for

such

reimbursement may be brought in state court.
The stronger argument for petitioner,

the School of

Burlington, is that relied in Anderson v. Thompson, a CA7
decision

of 1981.

That court reasoned

provided basically for
the

right

to

an

§1415(e) (2)

"procedural safeguards",

impartial

complaints of parents.

that

due

process

including

hearing

on

This is not a frivolous argument,

and does make the question close.
Second Question
Is the award of such damages barred by §1415(e) (3)

if

parents unilaterally change their child's school placement
without the prior consent of school officials?
I think it unnecessary to reach this question on the
facts of the case.

Section 1415(e) (3) does not appear to

bar tuition reimbursement when parents unilaterally make a

·.

. /'

change.

~t~'
But in this case both the school district and the

/1

parents had agreed that the child's placement at Memorial
School was no longer appropriate.

Thus there had been an

agreement in effect that there should be some alternative
to the "then current placement".
Summary:
Affirm

CAl

on

the

availability

reimbursement under §1415(e) (2).
question

whether

§1415(e) (3)

of

tuition

Unnecessary to reach the

bars

reimbursement

on

the

facts of this case - where the parties had agreed that the
current placement of the child was inappropriate.
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aml 3/27/85

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmar ie

Re:

No. 84-433, School Committee of Burlington

School Committee of Burlington: The argument in this
case has not changed my view that the Court should affirm
----...

-

CAl in this case.

In fact, I'm more convinced now.

Petr

didn't make any clear argument at all that, as a general
matter, tuition reimbursement is not appropriate relief
under §1415(e) (2).

Instead, petr focused on the reasonable-

ness of awarding reimbursement in this case, and specificallyon whether the parents' made a unilateral decision to
change the child's placement in violation of (e) (3).

I

think this question is best resolved by viewing the child's
"current placement" as his placement in Memorial School.
Since the town and parents agreed that the child's current
placement was inappropriate, the parents were under no obligation to let him remain there.

As a result, if the school

district did not provide an appropriate placement for the
child, as the State hearing officer found, then I think tu-
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To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmar ie

Re:

No. 84-433, School Committee of Burlington

School Committee of Burlington: The argument in this
case has not changed my view that the Court should affirm
::>

CAl in this case.

In fact, I'm more convinced now.

Petr

didn't make any clear argument at all that, as a general
matter, tuition reimbursement is not appropriate relief
under §1415 (e) (2).

Instead, petr focused on the reasonable-

ness of awarding reimbursement in this case, and specificallyon whether the parents' made a unilateral decision to
change the child's placement in violation of (e) (3).

I

think this question is best resolved by viewing the child's
"current placement" as his placement in Memorial School.
Since the town and parents agreed that the child's current
placement was inappropriate, the parents were under no obligation to let him remain there.

As a result, if the school

district did not provide an appropriate placement for the
child, as the State hearing officer found, then I think tu-

2.
ition reimbursement is appropriate relief under
the statute.

(e) (2) of

l

aml

3/28/85

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmarie

Re:

School Committee of Burlington, No. 84-433

Sequence of Events
Sept. 1975 - June 1979:

Child attended Memorial

School, a public school
March 1978:
ents.

first IEP proposed and accepted by par-

Under its terms, child is to stay in Memorial School,

but spend part of each day in reading clinic.

IEP to remain

in effect for one year.
May - June 1979: parents and school officials cqpon new IEP for the 1979-1980 school year.

-~

All oar-

~

I
"'
ties I agreed
that child should not remain at Memorial School.

---

They ~isagreed on what would be an appropriate placement, at
least in part because they disagreed on the source of the
child's

l~arning

disability.

Early summer 1979: school officials proposed IEP for
coming school year. The plan called for child's transfer
from Memorial School to a separate special class at the Pine
Glen School, another public school in Burlington .

. J

2.

July 3, 1979: parents rejected IEP and commenced administrative proceedings.
July 10, 1979: Dr. Lott, a pediatric neurologist at
Mass. General Hospital, informed parents that testing revealed their child to have "severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties."
men~ l,

He recommended place-

which had a specialized program for

children with such handicaps.
July - August 1979: parents and school officials unsuccessfully attempted to mediate their dispute about appropriate placement and parents decided to pursue administrativ~ es.

September 1979: parents enrolled child in Carroll
School. Hearings were held on Sept. 26, Oct. 30-31, and Nov.
1, 1979.
January 1980:

State administrative hearing officer

rendered her decision that the placement proposed by school
~

officials was not appropriate.

She ordered the town to re-

-------------------------

imburse parents for tuition already paid to Carroll School.
~bruary

1980: Town filed suit in DC.

3.
Discussion of the Applicability of §1415(e) (3)
Section 1415 (e) (3) of the statute provides:
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the
State or local educational agency and the
parents or guardian otherwise agree, the
child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child • • • .
This case raises two questions about this section:
first,Cl2hat was the child's "then current educational
placement?" and seconc:Pdoes this section apply if the parties have "otherwise agreed" that the current placement is
not appropriate?
Current Educational Placement:

Petr claims that the

placement it proposed in the summer of 1979 (Pine Glen
School) was the "then current educational placement" and
thus that the statute required that the child "remain" in
that placement pending the administrative and judicial proceedings. This proposition seems quite farfetched to me.
The child was never attended the Pine Glen School, and thus
it doesn't make sense that statute would require him to "remain" there.

A far more reasonable interpretation, I think,

is to view Memorial School as the child's "then current educational placement."

This is the school he last attended,

~

and would have continued to attend if he had progressed in
the normal course.
"Otherwise Agreed": If my argument is correct that
Memorial School was the child's then current placement, the
question becomes, have the parties "otherwise agreed" that

4.
he should not remain there during pendency of the administrative and judicial proceedings?

I would say that they
~

have so agreed, because both parties agree that Memorial
School is no longer appropriate.

~I

Indeed, at argument,

petr's attorney conceded that he did not think the child had
to remain in Memorial School.
It is possible, however, to argue that the statute
requires the child to remain in a concededly inappropriate
placement if there is no agreement on an interim placement
while proceedings are pending.

One reading of the Depart-

ment of Education's "Notice of Interpretation" for
§1415(e) (3) suggests that the Department takes this position.

I've attached a copy of the regulation.

Since petr

did not take this position, and the regulation is somewhat
ambiguous, the Court can hold that in this case the parties
have agreed that the child need not remain in the Memorial
School.

If the Court so holds, then it need not reach the

question whether the statute would bar reimbursement if,
without the school's agreement, the parents had changed
their child's placement while proceedings were pending.
Appropriateness of Parents' Choice: You asked me to
explain how the statute would prevent parents from making an
extravagant choice for their child, e. g., sending their
child to St. Paul's, at the Town's expense.

l

I think the

answer is that the hearing officer, and ultimately the DC,
have discretion to award "appropriate relief."

In most

cases, parents would be hard pressed to justify reimburse-

5.

ment for sending their child to St. Paul's if there a local,
less costly program that would meet the child's needs.

The

applicable Massachusetts regulation requires the school district to pay for private schooling if the hearing officer
"determines that the IEP developed by the school committee
is inadequate and the parent's choice of placement is appropriate • • •

II

Thus, the fact that school officials did

not offer an appropriate placement does not necessarily mean
that the Town must pay for parents' choice.

The hearing

officer must determine the appropriateness of parents'
choice as well.

Moreover, the statute expresses a clear

preference for free, public education, and thus reimbursement for any private school is available only when there is
no appropriate public alternative.

.~.

,·.

Chapter 111-0H. of Spec. Educ. and Rehab. Services
cation program. <See Questions 37-43,
below, regarding goals and objectives in the
IEP.> However, since the IEP Is not Intended to Include the specifics about a child's
total educational program that are found In
dally, weekly, or monthly Instructional
plans, parents will often need to obtain
more specific, on-going Information about
the child's progress-through parent-teach·
er conferences, report cards and other reportin& procedures ordinarily used by the
agency.
34. Mu&t lEPs include speci,fic "checkpoint
intervals" for parenls to conJer with teach-

ers and to revise or update their children's
lEPs?

t

}

1
)

}

No. A handicapped child's IEP Is not reQuired to Include specific "checkpoint Intervals" <I.e., meeting dates> for reviewing the
child's progress. However, In Individual situations, specific meeting dates could be designated In the IEP, If the parents and school
presonnel believe that It would be helpful to
do so.
Although meeting dates are not required
to be set out In the IEP Itself, there are specific provisions In the regulations and In
this document regarding agency responsibilIties In Initiating IEP meetings, Including
the followlnr:
:
(1> Public agencies must hold meetlrigs periodically, but not less than annually, to
review, and If appropriate, revise, each
child's IEP <1300.343(d)); <2> there should
be as many meetings a year as the child
needs <see Question 10, above>; and <3> agencies should grant any reasonable parental
request for an IEP meeting <see Question
11, above>.
In addition to the above provisions, it Is
expected that, through an agency's general
reporting procedures for all children in
school, there will be specific designated
times for parents to review their children's
progress <e.r.. through periodic parentteacher conferences, and/or the use of
report cards, letters, or other reporting devices>.
35. II the parents and agency are unable to
reach agreement at an IEP meeting, what

steps should be followed until agreement is
reached?

As a general rule, the agency and parents
would agree to an Interim course of action
for serving the child <I.e., in terms of placement and/or services> to be followed until
the area of disagreement over the IEP is resolved. The manner In which this interim
measure Is developed and agreed to by both
parties Is left to the discretion of the Individual State or local agency. However, If the
parents and agency cannot agree on an in·
terlm measure, the child's last agreed upon
IEP would remain in effect in the areas of
disagreement until the disagreement is re·
solved. The following may be helpful to
agencies when there are disagreements:

App.C

a. There may be instances where the parents and agency are in agreement about the
basic IEP services <e.g., the child's placement and/or the special education services>.
but disagree about the provision of a par·
ticular related service <I.e., whether the
service is needed and/or the amount to be
provided>. In such cases, it is recommended
(1) that the IEP be implemented in all areas
in which there is agreement, <2> that the
document indicate the points of disagreement, and <3> that procedures be initiated to
resolve the disagreement.
b. Sometimes the disagreement is with the
placement or kind of special education to be
provided <e.g., one party proposes a self-contained placement, and the other proposes
resource room services). In such cases, the
agency might, for example, carry out any
one or all of the following steps:
<1 > Remind the parents that they may resolve their differences through the due
process procedures under EHA-B; <2> work
with the parents to develop an interim
course of action (in terms of placement
and/or services> which both parties can
agree to until resolution Is reached; and (3)
recommend the use of mediation, or some
other informal procedure for resolving the
differences without going to a due process
hearing. <See Question 32, above, regarding
the right to appeal.>
c. If, because of the disagreement over the
IEP, a hearing is initiated by either the parents or agency, the agency may not change
the child's placement unless the parents
and agency agree otherwise. <See I 300.513,
Child's status during proceedings.> The following two examples are related to this requirement:
<1 >A child In the regular fourth grade has
been evaluated and found tp be eligible for
special education. The agency and parents
agree that the child has a specific leamlnr
disability. However, one party proposes
placement in a self-contained program, and
the other proposes placement in a resource
room. Agreement cannot be reached, and a
due process hearing Is initiated. Unless the
parents and agency agree otherwise, the
child would remain in the regular fourth
grade until the issue Is resolved.
On the other hand, since the child's need
for special education Is not In question, both
parties might agree-as an Interim measure-<1 > to temporarily place the child in
either one of the programs proposed at the
meeting <self-contained program or resource
room>. or <2> to serve the child through
some other temporary arrangement.
<2> A handicapped child is currently receiving special education under an existing
IEP. A due process hearing has been inltiat·
ed regarding an alternative special educa·
tion placement for the child. Unless the parents and agency agree otherwise, the child

77

Title 34-Education

App. C

whether or not a particular service should
continue to be provided under the IEP <e.g.,
physical therapy), that service would continue to be provided to the child under the
IEP that was in effect at the time the hearing was initiated, <1> unless the parents and
agency agree to a change in the services, or
<2> until the issue is resolved.

would remain in the current placement. In
this situation, the child's IEP could be revised, as necessary, and implemented In all
of the areas agreed to by the parents and
agency, while the area of disagreement <I.e.,
the child's placement> is being settled
through due process.
NoTE: If the due process hearing concerns

§ 300.346 Content of individualized educa-

tion program.
The individuallzed education program
for each chlld must Include:
<a> A statement of the child's present
levels of educational performance;
<b> A statement of annual goals, Including short term Instructional objectives;
<c> A statement of the specific special
education and related services to be pr<>vided to the chlld, and the extent to
which the chlld will be able to participate In regular educational programs;

<d> The projected dates for Initiation
of services and the anticipated duration
of the services; and
<e> Appropriate objective crl:terla and
evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis,
whether the short tenn instructional objectives are being achieved.
(20 U.S.C . 1401 (19); 1412 (2) (B), (4), (II),
1414(a)(6); Senate Report No . 94- 168, p . 11
(1975) . )

the handicap on the child's performance.
Thus, raw scores would not usually be sufficient.
•
c. There should be a direct relationship
between the present levels of educational
performance and the other components of
the IEP. Thus, If the statement describes a
problem with the child's reading level and
points to a deficiency In a specific reading
skill, this problem should be addressed
under both (1) goals and objectives, and <2>
specific special education and related services to be provided to the child.
37. Why are goals and objectives require in

36. What should be included in the statement of the child's present levels of educational performance?

The statement of present levels of educational performance will be different for
each handicapped child. Thus, determinations about the content of the statement for
an Individual child are matters that are left
to the discretion of participants In the IEP
meetings. However, the following are some
points which should be taken Into account
in writing thl6 part of the IEP.
a. The statement should accurately describe the effect of the child's handicap on
the child's performance In any area of education that Is affected, including <1> academic areas <reading, math, communication,
etc.), and <2> non-academic areas <daily life
activities, mobility, etc.).

the IEP?

NoTE: Labels such as "mentally retarded"
or "deaf" may not be used as a substitute
for the description of present levels of educational performance.>
b. The statement should be written in objective measurable terms, to the extent possible. Data from the child's evaluation
would be a good source of such information.
Test scores that are pertinent to the child's
diagnosis might be included, where appropriate. However, the scores should be <ll
self-explanatory <i.e., they can be interpreted by all participants without the use of test
manuals or other aids>. or <2> an explanation should be included. Whatever test results are used should reflect the impact of

The statutory requirements for Including
annual goals and short term' objectives <Section 602< 19)(B)), and for having at least an
annual review of a handicapped child's IEP
<Section 614<a)(5)), provide a mechanism for
determining <1 > whether the anticipated
outcomes for the child are being met (I.e ..
whether the child is progressing In the special education program> and <2> whether the
placement and services are appropriate to
the child's special learning needs. In effect,
these requirements provide a way for the
child's teacher<s> and parents to be able to
track the child's progress in special education. However, the goals and objectives in
the IEP are not intended to be as specific as
the goals and objectives that are normally
found In daily, weekly, or monthly instructional plans.
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38. What are "annual goals " in an IEP?

Title 34-Education

§ 300.385
and practices targeted on identified
local needs; and
<3> Use of instructional materials
and other media for personnel development and instructional programming.
<20 U .S .C. 1413<aH3»
§ 300.385

Adoption of educational prac-

tices.

<a> Each annual program plan must
provide for a statewide system designed to adopt, where appropriate,
promising educational practices and
materials proven effective through research and demonstration.
<b> Each annual program plan must
provide for thorough reassessment of
educational practices used in the
State.
<c> Each annual program plan must
provide for the identification of State,
local, and regional resources <human
and material> which will assist in
meeting the State's personnel preparation needs.
(20 u.s.c. 1413(&)(3))
§ 300.386

[Reserved]

Technical assistance
educational agencies.

§ 300.387

to

local

Each annual program plan must include a description of technical assistance that the State educational
agency gives to local educational agencies in their implementation of the
State's comprehensive system of personnel development.
(20 u.s.c. 1413(&)(3))

Subpart D-Private Schools

Responsibility of State educational agency.

§ 300.401

Each State educational agency shall
insure that a handicapped child who is
placed in or referred to a private
school or facility by a public agency:
<a> Is provided special education and
related services:
<1 > In conformance with an individualized education program which
meets
the
requirements
under
§ § 300.340- 300.349 of Subpart C;
<2> At no cost to the parents; and
<3> At a school or facility which
meets the standards that apply to
State and local educational agencies
<including the requirements in this
part>; and
<b> Has all of the rights of a handicapped child who is served by a public
agency.
<20 U .S .C . 1413<a><4><B»

Implementation by State educational agency.

§ 300.402

In implementing § 300.401, the State
educational agency shall:
<a> Monitor compliance through procedures such as written reports, onsite visits, and parent questionnaires:
<b> Disseminate copies of applicable
standards to each private school and
facility to which a public agency has
referred or placed a handicapped
child; and
<c> Provide an opportunity for those
private schools and facilities to participate in the development .and revision
of State standards which apply to
them.
<20 U.S.C . 1413<a><4HB»

Placement of children by parents.
<a> If a handicapped child has avail-

§ 300.403

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN PRIVATE
SCHOOLS PLACED OR REFERRED BY
PuBLIC AGENCIES
§ 300.400

Applicability

of

able a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to place
the child in a private school or facility,
the public agency is not required by
this part to pay for the child's education at the private school or facility .
However, the public agency shall make
services available to the child as provided under § § 300.450-300.460.
<b> Disagreements between a parent
and a public agency regarding the
availability of a program appropriate

§§ 300.401-

300.403.

Sections 300.401-300.403 apply only
to handicapped children who are or
have been placed in or referred to a
private school or facility by a public
agency as a means of providing special
education and related services.
<20 U .S .C. 1413<a><4><B»
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Chapter 111-0ff. of Spec. Educ. and Rehab. Services
for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to
the due process procedures under
§§ 300.500- 300.514 of Subpart E.
(20 U.S .C. 1412<2HBl; 1415>

Definition of "private
handicapped children."

school

As used in §§ 300.451- 300.452, " private school handicapped children"
means handicapped children enrolled
in private schools or facilities other
than handicapped children covered
under § § 300.400- 300.403.
<20 U.S .C. 1413<aH4HAll
[45 FR 22531. Apr. 3. 1980. Redesignated at
45 FR 77368, Nov. 21, 1980]
§ 300.451

State educational agency responsibility.

The State educational agency shall
insure that:
<a> To the extent consistent with
their number and location in the
State, provision is made for the participaUon of private school handicapped children in the program assisted or carried out under this part by
providing them with special education
and related services; and
(b) The requirements in 34 CFR
76.651-76.663 of EDGAR are met.
<20 U.S .C. 1413<aH4HAll
[45 FR 22531, Apr. 3, 1980. Redesignated at
45 FR 77368, Nov. 21, 1980]
§ 300.452

Local
sponsibility.

educational

Subpart E-Procedural Safeguards
DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES FOR PARENTS
AND CHILDREN

§ 300.500

HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN
IN
PRIVATE
SCHOOLS NOT PLACED OR REFERRED BY
PUBLIC AGENCIES

§ 300.450

§ 300.501

agency

re-

<a> Each local educational agency
shall provide special education and related services designed to meet the
needs of private school handicapped
children residing in the jurisdiction of
the agency.

Definitions of "consent", "evaluation", and "personally identifiable".

As used in this part: "Consent"
means that:
(a) The parent has been fully informed of all information relevant to
the activity for which consent is
sought, in his or her native language,
or other mode of communication;
<bl The parent understands and
agrees in writing to the carrying out of
the activity for which his or her consent is sought, and the consent describes that activity and lists the records Of any> which will be released
and to whom; and
(c) The parent understands that the
granting of consent is voluntary on
the part of the parent and may be revoked at any time.,
" Evaluation" means procedures used
in accordance with § § 300.530- 300.534
to determine whether a child is handicapped and the nature and extent of
the special education and related services that the child needs. The term
means procedures used selectively
with an individual child and does not
include basic tests administered to or
procedures used with all children in a
school, grade, or class.
"Personally identifiable" means that
information includes:
<a> The name of the child, the
child's parent, or other family
member;
<bl The address of the child;
(c) A personal identifier, such as the
child's social security number or student number; or
<dl A list of personal characteristics
or other information which would
make it possible to identify the child
with reasonable certainty.
<20 U.S .C. 1415, 1417<c»
§ 300.501

General responsibility of public
agencies.

<Sec. 1413<aH4HAl; 1414<aH6ll

Each State educational agency shall
insure that each public agency establishes and Implements procedural safeguards which meet the requirements
of § § 300.500-300.514.

[42 FR 42476, Aug. 23 , 1977, as amended at
45 FR 22531, Apr. 3. 1980. Redesignated at
45 FR 77368, Nov. 21 , 1980]
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OF BURLINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS ET AL.
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175,
as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq., requires participating
state and local educational agencies "to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of
free appropriate public education" to such handicapped children. § 1415(a). These procedures include the right of the
parents to participate in the development of an "individualized education program" (IEP) for the child and to challenge
in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with
which they disagree. §§ 1401(19), 1415(b),(d),(e). Where as
in the present case review of a contested IEP takes years to
run its course-years critical to the child's developmentimportant practical questions arise concerning interim placement of the child and financial responsiblity for that placement. This case requires us to address some of those
questions.
Michael Panico, the son of respondent Robert Panico, was
a first grader in the public school system of petitioner Town
of Burlington, Massachusetts, when he began experiencing
serious difficulties in school. It later became evident that
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he had "specific learning disabilities" and thus was "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act, 20 U. S. C.§ 1401(1).
This entitled him to receive at public expense specially
designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as
related transportation. §§ 1401(16), 1401(17). The negotiations and other proceedings between the Town and the Panicos, thus far spanning more than 8 years, are too involved to
relate in full detail; the following are the parts relevant to the
issues on which we granted certiorari.
In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of
the Memorial School, a public school in Burlington, Mass.,
under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading specialist for one hour a day and individual and group counselling. Michael's continued poor performance and the fact that
Memorial School encompassed only grades K through 3 led to
much discussion between his parents and Town school officials about his difficulties and his future schooling. Apparently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly;
the upshot was that the Panicos and the Town agreed that
Michael was generally of above average to superior intelligence, but had special educational needs calling for a placement in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed over
the source and exact nature of Michael's learning difficulties,
the Town believing the source to be emotional and the parents believing it to be neurological.
In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a proposed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. It
called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six
children with special academic and social needs, located at
another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July
3, Michael's father rejected the proposed IEP and sought review'illider§ 1415(b)(2) by respondent Mass. Department of
Education's Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA).
A hearing was initially scheduled for August 8, but was apparently postponed in favor of a mediation session on August
17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful.
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Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest
expert evaluation of Michael by specialists at Mass. General
Hospital, who opined that Michael's "emotional difficulties
are secondary to a rather severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties" and recommended "a highly
specialized setting for children with learning handicaps ...
such as the Carroll School," a State approved private school
for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. Joint App.
pp. 26, 31. Believing that the Town's proposed placement of
Michael at the Pine Glen school was inappropriate in light of
Michael's needs, Mr. Panico enrolled Michael in the Carroll
School in mid-August at his own ---exi)ense, and Michael
started there in September.
The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979,
and in January 1980 the hearing officer decided that the
Town's proposed placement at t e me len c ool was inapproprla e an tha the arro School was "the east restrictive a equate program within the record" for Michael's educational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay
for Michael's tuition and transportation to the Carroll School
for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the
Panicos for their expenditures on these items for the school
year to date.
The Town sought judicial review of the State's administrative decision in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2)
and a parallel State statute, naming Mr. Panico and the State
Department of Education as defendants. In November
1980, the District Court granted summary judgment against
the Town on the state-law claim under a "substantial evidence" standard of review, entering a final judgment on this
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The
Court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court
of Appeals vacated the judgment on the state-law claim,
holding that review under the State statute was preempted
by § 1415(e)(2), which establishes a "preponderance of the
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evidence" standard of review and which permits the reviewing court to hear additional evidence.
In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the
BSEA order, the District Court had denied a stay of that
order, and the Panicos and the State had moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The State also had threatened outside of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town's special education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA
order. Apparently in response to this threat, · the Town
agreed in February 1981 to pay for Michael's Carroll School
placement and related transportation for the 1980-1981 term,
none of which had yet been paid, and to continue paying for
these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town
persisted in refusing to reimburse Mr. Panico for the expenses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of
Appeals disposed of the State claim, it also held that under
this status quo none of the parties could show irreparable injury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction.
The Court reasoned that the Town had not shown that Mr.
Panico would not be able to repay the tuition and related
costs borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits,
and Mr. Panico had not shown that he would be irreparably
harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments
which might ultimately be determined to be the Town's
responsibility.
On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pretrial order on the Town's federal claim. In denying the
Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(e)(3) did not bar reimbursement despite the Town's
insistence that the Panicos violated that provision by changing Michael's placement to the Carroll School during the
pendency of the administrative proceedings. The court reasoned that § 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of
the child and not the right to tuition reimbursement or to procedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with
the problem that no IEP had been developed for the
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1980-1981 or 1981-1982 school years. It held that its power
under § 1415(e)(2) to grant "appropriate" relief upon reviewing the contested IEP for the 1979-1980 school year included
the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite
the lack of IEPs for those years. In this connection, however, the court interpreted the statute to place the burden of
proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP
was inappropriate for 1979-1980 and on the Panicos and the
State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was
appropriate.
After a four-day trial, the District Court in May 1982 overturned the BSE-Aetecision, holding that the appropriate
1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by
the Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show
that this placement would not also have been appropriate for
subsequent years. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the Town was "not responsible for the cost of Michael's education at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80
through 1981-82."
In contesting the Town's proposed form of judgment embodying the court's conclusion, Mr. Panico argued that,
despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982,
he should be reimbursed for his expenditures in 1979-1980,
that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed
1981-1982 term, and that he should not be required to reimburse the Town for its payments to date, apparently because
the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the
administrative and judicial review contemplated by § 1415
(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge
and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar issues concerning the reimbursement for expenditures during
the pendency of review proceedings.
In a decision on the consolidated cases, the Court rejected
Mr. Panico's argument that the Carroll School was the "current educational placement" during the pendency of the review proceedings and thus that under § 1415(e)(3) the Town

A
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was obligated to maintain that placement. The Court reasoned that the Panicos' unilateral action in placing Michael at
the Carroll School without the Town's consent could not "confer thereon the imprimatur of continued placement," even
though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in
effect during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed
Michael was finished with the Memorial School and the Town
itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in
the fall.
The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently
grounded at least in part on a State regulation, that the
Panicos were entitled to rely on the BSEA decision upholding
their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether
that decision were ultimately reversed by a court. With
respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSEA
decision, under the State's threat to cut off funding, the court
criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to
enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this
"was not a case where the town was legally obligated under
section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status
quo," the State's coercion could not be viewed as "the basis
for a final decision on liability" and it could only be "regarded
as other than wrongful ... on the assumption that the payments were to be returned if the order was ultimately
reversed." The court entered a judgment ordering the
Panicos to reimburse the Town for its payments for Michael's
Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980-1981
and 1981-1982. The Panicos appealed.
In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the
Court of"Appeals for t e F1r t Circu' re anded the case a
secon time. The court ruled, among other things, that t e
Distri'CtCOurt erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it
gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and that in
other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The
court also considered several questions about the availability
of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued
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that § 1415(e)(3) bars the Panicos from any reimbursement
relief, even if on remand they were to prevail on the merits of
the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael's
placement during the pendency of the § 1415(e)(2) proceedings. The court held that such unilateral parental change of
placement would not be "a bar to reimbursement of the parents if their actions are held to be appropriate at final judgment." In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack
of parental consultation with the Town or "attempt to achieve
a negotiated compromise and agreement on a private placement," as contemplated by the Act, "may be taken into
account in a district court's computation of an award of equitable reimbursement." To guide the District Court on remand, the court stated that "whether to order reimbursement, and at what amount, is a question determined by
balancing the equities." The court also held that the
Panicos' reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town
from obtaining reimbursement "for the period of reliance and
requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period,
they must be reimbursed."
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certoriari in this
Court---challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals on
numerous iSsues, mclu mg the scope o JU 1c1a :r:.ev1ew of the
adiiliniStrative decision and the relevance to th~F merits of an
IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act's procedural requirements. We granted certiorari only to consider the following two issues: whether the potential relief
available under § 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to parents for private school tuition and related expenses, and
whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents
who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private
school without the consent of local school authorities. We
express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by
the Court of Appeals.
Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words:
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"to assure that all handicapped children have available to
them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights
of handicapped children and their parents or guardians
are protected." § 1400(c).
The Act defines a "free appropriate public education" to
mean:
"special education and related services which (A) have
been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with [an] individualized education program."
§ 1401(18).
To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides federal money to state and local educational agencies that undertake to implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. See Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 179-184 (1982).
The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned
"individualized educational program." The IEP is in brief a
comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and
related services to be employed to meets those needs.
§ 1401(19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school
official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the
parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In
several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the
parents in developing the child's educational program and assessing its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7),
1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345.
Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach
would not always produce a consensus between the schoOl of-

-
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ficials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school
officials would have a natural advantage, Congress
incoporated an elaborate et of what it label <J. ":erocedural
safeguards" to insure the full participation of the parentsand
p~solution of substantive disagreements.
Section
1415(b) entitles the parents "to examine all relevant records
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational
placement of the child," to obtain an independent educational
evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or
change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, and to present complaints with respect to
any of the above. The parents are further entitled to "an impartial due process hearing," which in the instant case was
the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints.
The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal
court to "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision"
made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the
reviewing court the following authority:
"[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate." § 1415(e)(2).
The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us
to dec1 e w e er is gran o au or1ty inc udes the power
to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.
We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement.
The statute directs the court ~t sucli relie!as [it]
determines is appropriate." The ordinary meaning of these
words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of
relief is not further specified, except that it must be "appropriate." Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be "appropriate" in light of the

..
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purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to
provide handicapped children with "a free appropriate public
education which emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs." The Act contemplates that such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools, with the child participating as
much as possible in the same activities as non-handicapped
children, but the Act also provides for placement in private
schools at public expense where this is not possible. See
§ 1412(5); 34 CFR §§300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347.
In a case where a court determines that a private placement
desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an
IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that "appropriate" relief
would include a prospective injunction directing the school
offici
o e e op and Imp ement at ub1ic expense aii IEP
placing t c I 1 a private sc oo .
I
e a mimstrative an JUdicial review under the Act
could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it
would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective
injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so vividly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in
most instances come a year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed. In the meantime, the parents
who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice:
go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it
turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider
to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter
course, which conscientious parents who have adequate
means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment
normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court
tell them several years later that they were right but that
these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed
by the school officials. If that were the case the child's right
to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to
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participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the
procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Because Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we
are confident that by empowering the court to grant "appropriate" relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper

"If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at
that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for
the child because an appropriate program does not exist
within the local educational agency responsible for the
child's education and the local educational agency disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who
remains financially responsible is a matter to which the
due process procedures established under [the predecessor to§ 1415] appl[y]." S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 32 (emphasis added).

See 34 CFR § 300.403(b) (disagreements and question of
financial responsibility subject to the due process
procedures).
Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form
of relief in a proper case, the Town maintains that the
Panicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to
reimbursement because they violated § 1415(e)(3), which
provides:
"During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the State or local educational
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the

)
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child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child. . .. "
We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael's
"then current placement" was in the summer of 1979, when
both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school
was in order. For the purposes of our decision, we assume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, was
Michael's current placement and, therefore, that the Panicos
did "change" his placement after they had rejected the IEP
and had set the administrative review in motion. In so
doing, the Panicos contravened the conditional command of
§ 1415(e)(3) that "the child shall remain in the then current
placement."
As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for
agreement by either the State or the local educational
agency. The BSEA's decision in favor of the Panicos and the
Carroll School placement would seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement. The decision
was issued in January 1980, so from then on the Panicos were
no longer in violation of§ 1415(e)(3). This conclusion, however, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because
the Panicos are also seeking reimbursement for Michael's expenses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State's concurrence in the Carroll School placement.
We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of
§ 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of reimbursement. The
provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver,
or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted
to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal
purpose of the Act will in many cases be defeated in the same
way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this
case, parents will often notice a child's learning difficulties
while the child is in a regular public school program. If the
school officials disagree with the need for special education or
the adequacy of the public school's program to meet the

\
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child's needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim private school placement while the review process runs its
course. Thus, under the Town's reading of§ 1415(e)(3), the
parents are forced to leave the child in what may turn out to
be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for
reimbursement. The Act was intended to give handicapped
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those
objectives.
The legislative history supports this interpretation, favoring a proper interim placement pending the resolution of disagreements over the IEP:
"The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due process hearing may be required to assure that the rights of
the child are completely protected. We did feel, however, that the placement, or change of placement should
not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the
conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the
needs of both the child and the state." 121 Cong. Rec.
37,412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford).
We think at least one purpose of§ 1415(e)(3) was to prevent
school officials from removing a child from the regular public
school classroom over the parents' objection pending completion of the review proceedings. As we observed in Rowley,
458 U. S., at 192, the impetus for the Act came from two federal court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971),
and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), and Mills v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D DC 1972), which
arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped children to
prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the
public schools. Congress was concerned about the apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children
to private institutions or warehousing them in special classes.
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See § 1400(4); 34 CFR §300.347(a). We also note that
§ 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safeguards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and
the child.
This is not to say that § 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents.
While we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to
order parents to leave their child in a particular placement,
we think it operates in sue a way that parents who unilaterally change e1r c ild's placemen urmg the pen ency of
review procee mgs, Wit out t e consent of state or local
school officials, do so at etr own financial risk. If the
courfSUlfimately etermme that the IEP proposed by the
school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred
from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in
which their child's placement violated§ 1415(e)(3). This conclusion is supported by the agency's intepretation of the Act's
application to private placements by the parents:
"(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to place
the child in a private school or facility, the public agency
is not required by this part to pay for the child's education at the private school or facility ....
"(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public
agency regarding the availability of a program appropriate for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to the due process procedures under
[§ 1415]." 34 CFR 300.403.
We thus resolve the questions on which we granted certiorari; because the case is here in an interlocutory osture, we
do not consider the estoppel ruling elow or tlie specific equitable factors identified by the Court of Appeals for granting
relief. We do think that the court was correct in concluding
that "such relief as the court determines is appropriate,"
within the meaning of§ 1415(e)(2), means equitable relief.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-433
BURLINGTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF THE TOWN
OF BURLINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[April - , 1985]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175,
as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq., requires participating
state and local educational agencies "to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of
free appropriate public education" to such handicapped children. § 1415(a). These procedures include the ri ht of the
p~~ntU.Q...Eg!ic~ the development of an "indiv1 ualiie<Iea1lcat1on program" (IEP) for the child and to challenge
in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with
which they disagree. §§ 1401(19), 1415(b),(d),(e). Where as
in the present case review of a contested IEP takes years to
run its course-years critical to the child's developmentimportant practical questions arise concerning interim placee ch1 d an
ancia responsiblity for that placement. This case requires us to address some of those
questions.
Michael Panico, the son of respondent Robert Panico, was
a first grader in the public school system of petitioner Town
of Burlington, Massachusetts, when he began experiencing
serious difficulties in school. It later became evident that
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he had "specific learning disabilities" and thus was "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act, 20 U. S. C.§ 1401(1).
This entitled him to receive at public expense specially
designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as
related transportation. §§ 1401(16), 1401(17). The negotiations and other proceedings between the Town and the Panicos, thus far spanning more than 8 years, are too involved to
relate in full detail; the following are the parts relevant to the
issues on which we granted certiorari.
In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of
the Memorial School, a public school in Burlington, Mass. ,
under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading specialist for one hour a day and individual and group counselling. Michael's continued poor performance and the fact that
Memorial School encompassed only grades K through 3 led to
much discussion between his parents and Town school officials about his difficulties and his future schooling. Apparently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly;
the upshot was that the Panicos and the Town agreed that
Michael was generally of above average to superior intelligence, but had special educational needs calling for a placement in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed over
the source and exact nature of Michael's learning difficulties,
the Town believing the source to be emotional and the parents believing it to be neurological.
In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a proposed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. It
called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six
children with special academic and social needs, located at
another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July
3, Michael's father rejected the proposed IEP and sought review under § 1415(b)(2) by respondent Mass. Department of
Education's Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA).
A hearing was initially scheduled for August 8, but was apparently postponed in favor of a mediation session on August
17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful.

.
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Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest
expert evaluation of Michael by specialists at Mass. General
Hospital, who opined that Michael's "emotional difficulties
are secondary to a rather severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties" and recommended "a highly
specialized setting for children with learning handicaps . . .
such as the Carroll School," a State approved private school
for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. Joint App.
pp. 26, 31. Believing that the Town's proposed placement of
Michael at the Pine Glen school was inappropriate in light of
Michael's needs, Mr. Panico enrolled Michael in the Carroll
School in mid-August at his own expense, and Michael
started there in September.
The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979,
and in January 1980 the hearing officer decided that the
Town's proposed placement at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was "the least restrictive adequate program within the record" for Michael's educational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay
for Michael's tuition and transportation to the Carroll School
for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the
Panicos for their expenditures on these items for the school
year to date.
The Town sought judicial review of .the State's administrative decision in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U. S. C.§ 1415(e)(2)
and a parallel State statute, naming Mr. Panico and the State
Department of Education as defendants. In November
1980, the District Court granted summary judgment against
the Town on the state-law claim under a "substantial evidence" standard of review, entering a final judgment on this
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The
Court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court
of Appeals vacated the judgment on the state-law claim,
holding that review under the State statute was preempted
by § 1415(e)(2), which establishes a "preponderance of the
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evidence" standard of review and which permits the reviewing court to hear additional evidence.
In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the
BSEA order, the District Court had denied a stay of that
order, and the Panicos and the State had moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The State also had threatened outside of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town's special education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA
order. Apparently in response to this threat, the Town
agreed in February 1981 to pay for Michael's Carroll School
placement and related transportation for the 1980-1981 term,
none of which had yet been paid, and to continue paying for
these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town
persisted in refusing to reimburse Mr. Panico for the expenses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of
Appeals disposed of the State claim, it also held that under
this status quo none of the parties could show irreparable injury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction.
The Court reasoned that the Town had not shown that Mr.
Panico would not be able to repay the tuition and related
costs borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits,
and Mr. Panico had not shown that he would be irreparably
harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments
which might ultimately be determined to be the Town's
responsibility.
On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pretrial order on the Town's federal claim. In denying the
Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U. S. C.
§ 1415(e)(3) did not bar reimbursement despite the Town's
insistence that the Panicos violated that provision by changing Michael's placement to the Carroll School during the
pendency of the administrative proceedings. The court reasoned that § 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of
the child and not the right to tuition reimbursement or to procedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with
the problem that no IEP had been developed for the
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1980-1981 or 1981-1982 school years. It held that its power
under § 1415(e)(2) to grant "appropriate" relief upon reviewing the contested IEP for the 1979-1980 school year included
the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite
the lack of IEPs for those years. In this connection, however, the court interpreted the statute to place the burden of
proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP
was inappropriate for 1979-1980 and on the Panicos and the
State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was
appropriate.
After a four-day trial, the District Court in May 1982 overturned the BSEA decision, holding that the appropriate
1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by
the Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show
that this placement would not also have been appropriate for
subsequent years. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the Town was "not responsible for the cost of Michael's education at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80
through 1981-82."
In contesting the Town's proposed form of judgment embodying the court's conclusion, Mr. Panico argued that,
despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982,
he should be reimbursed for his expenditures in 1979-1980,
that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed
1981-1982 term, and that he should not be required to reimburse the Town for its payments to date, apparently because
the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the
administrative and judicial review contemplated by § 1415
(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge
and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar issues concerning the reimbursement for expenditures during
the pendency of review proceedings.
In a decision on the consolidated cases, the Court rejected
Mr. Panico's argument that the Carroll School was the "current educational placement" during the pendency of the review proceedings and thus that under § 1415(e)(3) the Town
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was obligated to maintain that placement. The Court reasoned that the Panicos' unilateral action in placing Michael at
the Carroll School without the Town's consent could not "confer thereon the imprimatur of continued placement," even
though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in
effect during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed
Michael was finished with the Memorial School and the Town
itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in
the fall.
The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently
grounded at least in part on a State regulation, that the
Panicos were entitled to rely on the BSEA decision upholding
their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether
that decision were ultimately reversed by a court. With
respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSEA
decision, under the State's threat to cut off funding, the court
criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to
enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this
"was not a case where the town was legally obligated under
section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status
quo," the State's coercion could not be viewed as "the basis
for a final decision on liability" and it could only be "regarded
as other than wrongful ... on the assumption that the payments were to be returned if the order was ultimately
reversed." The court entered a judgment ordering the
Panicos to reimburse the Town for its payments for Michael's
Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980-1981
and 1981-1982. The Panicos appealed.
In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the case a
second time. The court ruled, among other things, that the
District Court erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it
gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and that in
other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The
court also considered several questions about the availability
of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued
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that § 1415(e)(3) bars the Panicos from any reimbursement
relief, even if on remand they were to prevail on the merits of
the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael's
placement during the pendency of the § 1415(e)(2) proceedings. The court held that such unilateral parental change of
placement would not be "a bar to reimbursement of the parents if their actions are held to be appropriate at final judgment.'' In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack
of parental consultation with the Town or "attempt to achieve
a negotiated compromise and agreement on a private placement," as contemplated by the Act, "may be taken into
account in a district court's computation of an award of equitable reimbursement." To guide the District Court on remand, the court stated that "whether to order reimbursement, and at what amount, is a question determined by
balancing the equities." The court also held that the
Panicos' reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town
from obtaining reimbursement "for the period of reliance and
requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period,
they must be reimbursed."
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certoriari in this
Court challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals on
numerous issues, including the scope of judicial review of the
administrative decision and the relevance to the merits of an
IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act's procedural requirements. We granted certiorari only to consider the following two issues: whether the potential relief
available under § 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to parents for private school tuition and related expenses, and
whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents
who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private
school without the consent of local school authorities. We
express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by
the Court of Appeals.
Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words:
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"to assure that all handicapped children have available to
them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights
of handicapped children and their parents or guardians
are protected." § 1400(c).
The Act defines a "free appropriate public education" to
mean:
"special education and related services which (A) have
been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with [an] individualized education program."
§ 1401(18).
To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides federal money to state and local educational agencies that undertake to implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. See Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 179-184 (1982).
The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned
"individualized educational program." The IEP is in brief a
comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a· handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and
related services to be employed to meets those needs.
§ 1401(19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school
official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the
parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In
several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the
parents in developing the child's educational program and assessing its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7),
1415(b)(l)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345.
Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach
would not always produce a consensus between the school of-
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ficials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school
officials would have a natural advantage, Congress
incoporated an elaborate set of what it labeled "procedural
safeguards" to insure the full participation of the parents and
proper resolution of substantive disagreements. Section
1415(b) entitles the parents "to examine all relevant records
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational
placement of the child," to obtain an independent educational
evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or
change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, and to present complaints with respect to
any of the above. The parents are further entitled to "an impartial due process hearing," which in the instant case was
the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints.
The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal
court to "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision"
made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the
reviewing court the following authority:
"[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate." § 1415(e)(2).
The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us
to decide whether this grant of authority includes the power
to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.
We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement.
The statute directs the court to "grant such relief as [it]
determines is appropriate." The ordinary meaning of these
words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of
relief is not further specified, except that it must be "appropriate." Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be "appropriate" in light of the
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purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to
provide handicapped children with "a free appropriate public
education which emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs." The Act contemplates that such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools, with the child participating as
much as possible in the same activities as non-handicapped
children, but the Act also provides for placement in private
schools at public expense where this is not possible. See
§ 1412(5); 34 CFR §§300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347.
In a case where a court determines that a private placement
desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an
IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that "appropriate" relief
would include a prospective injunction directing the school
officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP
placing the child in a private school.
If the administrative and judicial review under the Act
could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it
would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective
injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so vividly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in
most instances come a year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has pass·ed. In the meantime, the parents
who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice:
go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it
turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider
to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter
course, which conscientious parents who have adequate
means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment
normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court
tell them several years later that they were right but that
these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed
by the school officials. If that were the case the child's right
to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to
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participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the
procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Because Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we
are confident that by empowering the court to grant "appropriate" relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper
case.
In this Court, the Town repeatedly characterizes reimbursement as "damages," but that simply is not the case.
Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay
expenses that it should have paid all along and would have
borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP.
Such a post-hoc determination of financial responsbility was
contemplated in the legislative history:
"If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at
that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for
the child because an appropriate program does not exist
within the local educational agency responsible for the
child's education and the local educational agency disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who
remains financially responsible is a matter to which the
due process procedures established·under [the predecessor to § 1415] appl[y]." S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 32 (emphasis added).
See 34 CFR § 300.403(b) (disagreements and question of
financial responsibility subject to the due process
procedures).
Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form
of relief in a proper case, the Town maintains that the
Panicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to
reimbursement because they violated § 1415(e)(3), which
provides:
"During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the State or local educational
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the
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child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child. . . ."
We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael's
"then current placement" was in the summer of 1979, when
both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school
was in order. For the purposes of our decision, we assume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, was
Michael's current placement and, therefore, that the Panicos
did "change" his placement after they had rejected the IEP
and had set the administrative review in motion. In so
doing, the Panicos contravened the conditional command of
§ 1415(e)(3)' that "the child shall remain in the then current
placement."
As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for
agreement by either the State or the local educational
agency. The BSEA's decision in favor of the Panicos and the
Carroll School placement would seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement. The decision
was issued in January 1980, so from then on the Panicos were
no longer in violation of § 1415(e)(3). This conclusion, however, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because
the Panicos are also seeking reimbursement for Michael's expenses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State's concurrence in the Carroll School placement.
We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of
§ 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of reimbursement. The
provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver,
or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted
to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal
purpose of the Act will in many cases be defeated in the same
way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this
case, parents will often notice a child's learning difficulties
while the child is in a regular public school program. If the
school officials disagree with the need for special education or
the adequacy of the public school's program to meet the
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child's needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim private school placement while the review process runs its
course. Thus, under the Town's reading of§ 1415(e)(3), the
parents are forced to leave the child in what may turn out to
be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for
reimbursement. The Act was intended to give handicapped
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those
objectives.
The legislative history supports this interpretation, favoring a proper interim placement pending the resolution of disagreements over the IEP:
"The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due process hearing may be required to assure that the rights of
the child are completely protected. We did feel, however, that the placement, or change of placement should
not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the
conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the
needs of both the child and the state." 121 Cong. Rec.
37,412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford).
We think at least one purpose of§ 1415(e)(3) was to prevent
school officials from removing a child from the regular public
school classroom over the parents' objection pending completion of the review proceedings. As we observed in Rowley,
458 U. S., at 192, the impetus for the Act came from two federal court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971),
and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), and Mills v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D DC 1972), which
arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped children to
prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the
public schools. Congress was concerned about the apparently widespread practice ofrelegating handicapped children
to private institutions or warehousing them in special classes.
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See § 1400(4); 34 CFR § 300.347(a). We also note that
§ 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safeguards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and
the child.
This is not to say that § 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents.
While we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to
order parents to leave their child in a particular placement,
we think it operates in such a way that parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of
review proceedings, without the consent of state or local
school officials, do so at their own financial risk. If the
courts ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the
school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred
from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in
which their child's placement violated § 1415(e)(3). This conclusion is supported by the agency's intepretation of the Act's
application to private placements by the parents:
"(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to place
the child in a private school or facility, the public agency
is not required by this part to pay for the child's education at the private school or facility ....
"(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public
agency regarding the availability of a program appropriate for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to the due process procedures under
[§ 1415]." 34 CFR 300.403.
We thus resolve the questions on which we granted certiorari; because the case is here in an interlocutory posture, we
do not consider the estoppel ruling below or the specific equitable factors identified by the Court of Appeals for granting
relief. We do think that the court was correct in concluding
that "such relief as the court determines is appropriate,"
within the meaning of§ 1415(e)(2), means equitable relief.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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